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IN MEMORIAM:
WILLIAM HUGHES MULLIGAN
Joseph M. McLaughlin*
In his lifetime a man plays many roles. I was fortunate-blessed
would be a better word-to know Bill Mulligan in his many incarna-
tions: teacher, Dean, Judge, and most memorably, friend. Our lives
and careers spiraled and intersected for forty-two years.
A superb teacher, a fine administrator, and then a gifted judge, he
never lost that sense of humor which gave him the fortitude to serve
Fordham for a quarter of a century, under five presidents during times
ranging from the halcyon days of the '50s through the Vietnam era. A
man without mirth is like a wagon without springs: he is jolted by
every pebble in the road. And, indeed, there were many pebbles in
the career of William Mulligan from the Bronx to the Bench.
He came to Fordham College in 1935 and achieved success as Edi-
tor of the Ram, when the school paper was still literate. Young Wil-
liam Mulligan came to Fordham Law School in 1939 as just plain Bill,
and later adopted the clerical middle name when he learned that he
was a collateral descendant-in those days the clergy did not acknowl-
edge direct descendants-of John Hughes, the first Archbishop of
New York. He served as an editor of the Law Review and upon grad-
uation entered the Army. He spent all of World War I chasing spies
in New York City, more particularly in Brooklyn, where he protected
the Gowanus Canal from German treachery.
Doffing his uniform, he came back to Fordhiam Law School, first as
a part-time teacher, while he practiced law at what would evolve into
the Shea Gould firm, and then on a full-time basis. Professor Mulli-
gan taught me Criminal Law in my first year at the Law School. He
subsequently taught me three other courses. At the end of my first
year, he became Dean of the Law School.
His accomplishments as Dean require no Boswell for it is univer-
sally known that Dean Mulligan brought Fordhiam Law School to Lin-
coin Square. For fifteen years his constancy demonstrated to student
and faculty alike that DEAN is not just another four-letter word. Ar-
istotle has observed that there are some professions in which a gen-
tleman cannot be virtuous. Bill Mulligan's career as Dean sorely
tested this dictum, but I think Dean Mulligan bested Aristotle in that
arena.
It was the boast of Ceasar Augustus that he found Rome of brick
and left it of marble. While I know that Dean Mulligan would have
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, 1990 to Present. Formerly, U.S. District Judge (E.D.N.Y.) 1981-1990.
1996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
shrugged off that comparison, I succeeded him as Dean and can attest
that the Law School he left had grown to prominence on his watch.
I became Dean on July 1, 1971. I remember it well. July, 1971 was
a steamy, sultry month, and Dean Mulligan had just been elevated to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Also ascended with him
were his desk, the better office appointments, and his secretary.
Working alone, midst a motley assembly of three legged chairs and
a table-not unlike what I had seen in a M.A.S.H. unit in Korea-I
answered the phone to hear a man asking to speak "to Dean Mulli-
gan." "He is not here," I responded, "for he is risen as he said he
would."' Risen he had, to make a lasting impress on the Second Cir-
cuit and to leave us a trove of hundreds of opinions, sparkling with
grace, learning, and, most notably, that lightening wit that was his
signature.
He first sat in August of that annus mirabilis. The judicial planets
were in alignment that month, for his first opinion, a criminal case,2
had drawn a galaxy of legal stars who would themselves eventually
ascend to the Bench: for the Government: Raymond J. Dearie (now
an Eastern District Judge) and on the brief David G. Trager (also a
District Judge). For the Defendant: Phylis Skloot Bamberger (now
an Acting State Supreme Court Justice). Anyone who knew Bill can
sense immediately that he struggled to restrain his natural impish
streak. He churned out a unanimous opinion of impeccable prose and
logic, but lacking the expected flashes of wit.
His self-control lasted three weeks. In his second opinion, also a
garden variety criminal case,3 Bill Timbers, a New Englander, first by
disposition and then by choice, was on the panel. A bank had been
held up by three masked men, and without eye-witness identifications,
the evidence was largely circumstantial. Trudo and Tatro were con-
victed and mounted an appeal on sufficiency of the evidence grounds.
Doubtless, with one eye on winning Timbers's concurrence, Mulligan
capitalized on Timbers's flinty respect for the virtues of parsimony:
There was abundant evidence of sudden acquisition of wealth on
the part of both Trudo and George Tatro after the robbery. Trudo
had a very meager income in the fall of 1969 and lived very mod-
estly. In the weeks following the robbery there was an abrupt
change in his spending habits. He purchased a used car for $500
and gave a $100 gift to a girl friend. In January, 1970 he paid $70 to
have his road plowed of snow, a most lavish and quixotic gesture for
any Vermonter irrespective of means. George Tatro was regularly
employed at a modest salary and did cash an insurance refund check
for $542.44 on December 29th, 1969. However, in January, 1970
1. Matthew 28:6.
2. United States v. Howell, 447 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1971).
3. United States v. Trudo, 449 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926
(1972).
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George Tatro participated in poker games where the stakes were as
high as $1,200 a hand. Although known as an average tipper, on
three occasions in January, 1970 he bought drinks for everyone at
the bar (8 to 10 people), paid his check with a $100 bill and left the
waitress a $10 tip, all of which was unprecedented4
Bill Mulligan had gone to Cathedral Prep, which in those days pre-
pared young men to enter the seminary. Though he abandoned his
clerical aspirations to enter Fordham College, that early clerical/Jesuit
formation surfaced in many of his opinions. Thus, in one of the many
IBM appeals that filled the Federal Reporters in the early 1970s, he
dissented on jurisdictional grounds from Leonard Moore's opinion re-
viewing an interlocutory order. Loosing an anathema, Mulligan
wrote: "It must languish in Purgatory until the Day of Final
Judgment."5
A lifelong devotee of Latin and Greek classics, he often laced his
opinions with classical allusions. In that same IBM dissent he re-
peated Judge Edelstein's (another classical scholar) caution against
opening "a Pandora's Box," which Mulligan quickly endorsed as being
"not as Delphic a pronouncement as it might first appear."6
His favorite allusion-and of this let there be no doubt-was to the
fabled "Serbonian Bog." Because even the Colorado Supreme Court
was befuddled by this reference ("Whatever kind of bog that is"),7 a
little background may be helpful. In the time of the Pharaohs there
was a marshy Lake Serbonis in Egypt. Herodotus, who was notori-
ously given to exaggeration, reported that entire armies disappeared
into the marshes. John Milton, in Paradise Lost,' carried the story
into English; and, then Cardozo, wrestling in insurance law, with the
distinction between accidental results and accidental means, charac-
terized the dichotomy as doomed to "plunge this branch of the law
into a Serbonian Bog."9 Teaching the Insurance course at Fordham (I
was one of his students), Dean Mulligan had led us through this bog,
only to become mired in the indemnity distinction between friendly
fires and hostile fires. The Serbonian Bog metaphor is about all I re-
call of the course on Insurance.
The Bog resurfaced a year after Judge Mulligan joined the Second
Circuit. The same dissenting opinion in the IBM case chastised Leo-
nard Moore's majority opinion as destined to "lead us only into the
4. Id. at 651.
5. IBM Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 980 (1974).
6. Id. at 521.
7. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hemenover, 67 P.2d 80, 81 (Colo. 1937).
8. John ilton, Paradise Lost, bk.ll, 1.592 (1667) ("that Serbonian bog... where
armies whole have sunk").
9. Landress v. Pheonix Mut Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491,499 (1934) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting).
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Serbonian Bog."1 When I upbraided him (ever so mildly) for this
conceit he told me that nobody would know what it meant and, be-
sides, said he, "the primary purpose of a dissent is to annoy the major-
ity." His love for the Bog is evident in three" other majority opinions
that he wrote. (As his faithful acolyte, I threw into one of my opin-
ions 2 a Monet-Manet distinction to the bemusement of two of my
colleagues.)
Judge Mulligan served for ten years on the Second Circuit. With
the celestial regularity of Haley's Comet, the judicial planets once
again fell into alignment for his final opinion. The panel, mirabile
dictu, included Bill Timbers (again) and District Judge Kevin Thomas
Duffy, two other jurists not adverse to a touch of Celtic wit. Neither,
it would seem, were the defendant (Janet Byrnes) or the trial judge
(Neal McCurn, N.D.N.Y.). The defendant was implicated in smug-
gling rare birds from Canada into the United States and then lying to
a grand jury about her involvement.
This landmark case, United States v. Byrnes,13 affirmed her convic-
tion unanimously. Bill Mulligan's opinion opened as follows:
Who knows what evil lurks in the hearts of men? Although the
public is generally aware of the sordid trafficking of drugs and aliens
across our borders, this litigation alerts us to a nefarious practice
hitherto unsuspected even by this rather calloused bench - rare
bird smuggling. This appeal is therefore accurately designated as
rara avis. While Canadian geese have been regularly crossing, exit-
ing, reentering and departing our borders with impunity, and appar-
ently without documentation, to enjoy more salubrious climes,
those unwilling or unable to make the flight either because of inade-
quate wing spans, lack of fuel or fear of buck shot, have become
prey to unscrupulous traffickers who put them in crates and ship
them to American ports of entry with fraudulent documentation in
violation of a host of federal statutes.' n
Several of the footnotes command attention. Footnote 8, for exam-
ple comments upon an observation that Judge McCurn had made dur-
ing the trial:
The trial judge, perhaps to relieve the tension, observed that while
he had enjoyed goose dinners he had never consumed swan-some
indication of the limited cuisine available in the Northern District.' 5
10. 471 F.2d at 519.
11. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977); Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d 975, 978 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Agur v. Wilson, 498 F.2d 961, 968 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1072 (1974).
12. United States v. Cropper, 42 F.3d 755, 759 (2d Cir. 1994).
13. 644 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981).
14. Id at 108-09.
15. Id at 110 n.8.
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There apparently was a difference of opinion as to whether swans
were birds for purposes of the federal statute. Footnote 9 is
illuminating:
For a liberal construction of the term "birds," by a Canadian court
see Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Criminal Law Quarterly 137 (1965-66) (Op.
Blue, J.), holding that an Indian who shot a pony which had broken
a leg and was saddled with a downy pillow had violated the Small
Birds Act which defined a "bird" as "a two legged animal covered
with feathers." The court reasoned that the statutory definition
"does not imply that only two-legged animals qualify, for the
legislative intent is to make two legs merely the minimum re-
quirement.... Counsel submits that having regard to the pur-
pose of the statute only small animals 'naturally covered' with
feathers could have been contemplated. However, had this
been the intention of the legislature, I am certain that the
phrase 'naturally covered' would have been expressly insertedjust as 'Long' was inserted in the Longshoreman's Act.
"Therefore, a horse with feathers on its back must be
deemed for the purpose of this Act to be a bird, a fortiori, a
pony with feathers on its back is a small bird." Id. at 139.16
The opinion concludes: "The judgment of conviction is affirmed,
justice has triumphed and this is my swan song. '17
It is not without significance that this last Mulligan opinion was filed
on St. Patrick's Day, 1981.
Sean O'Casey once observed that we Irish never hesitate to give a
serious thought the benefit and halo of a laugh. In a city of carbon
copies, William Hughes Mulligan was an original. He touched all who
knew him with his kindness and his unforgettable wit.
In the melancholy words from the refrain of an old Irish ballad:
The music in my heart I bore,
Long after it was heard no more.
16. Id. at 112 n.9.
17. Id at 112.
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